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MERCHANDISING ALLOWANCES AND SERVICES:
SECTIONS 2(d) AND 2(e) OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Earl W. Kintner*
The Robinson-Patman Act has often been referred to as the anti-price-
discrimination law. If the Robinson-Patman Act prohibited price discrimina-
tion alone, many opportunities for evasion and contravention of the basic pur-
pose of the law would be available. Experienced marketing executives know
there are many ways in which a supplier can favor one customer over other
customers beyond the grant of a concession in price. Think for a moment of
all the various types of merchandising assistance that suppliers customarily offer
to retailers: advertising and promotional allowances, handbills and signs, window
and floor displays and other point-of-purchase display materials, demonstrators
and demonstrations, display and storage cabinets, "push money" for sales clerks,
special packaging or package sizes, warehouse facilities, return privileges-the
list is virtually endless. Congressional spokesmen for the legislation were aware
that these types of merchandising assistance could be used to conceal price differ-
entiations. The law when originally drafted was aimed at stamping out the evil
of discrimination under the guise of advertising payments and promotional
services. After legislative deliberations it became apparent that injury was also
caused by advertising allowances to chains for promotional services even when
such services were actually rendered because the smaller merchants enjoyed no
comparable arrangement.
Thus, when finally enacted, the act contained provisions dealing with dis-
crimination by suppliers in these critical areas. Section 2(d) of the act relates
to payments or allowances by the seller to the buyer for promotional services and
requires such payments to be made available on proportionally equal terms to
all competing customers. Section 2(e) deals with the furnishing of services by
the seller to the buyer, requiring such services to be made available to all com-
peting customers on proportionally equal terms. Except for the meeting com-
petition defense, the two sister provisos are much like section 2(c), the so-called
brokerage section. Unlike section 2(a), dealing with price discrimination, sec-
tions 2(c), (d) and (e) require only a showing that the illicit practice occurred
as proof of a prima facie violation. The discrimination in allowances and ser-
vices declared unlawful is prohibited without regard to resulting injurious effects
on competition, as required under section 2(a). Similarly, while section 2(a)
permits cost justification for price discriminations it is not a defense under sections
2(d) or (e). This per se approach was adopted because Congress believed that
sellers would be forced to confine their discriminatory practices to price differ-
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entials, where they could be more readily detected and where it would be much
easier to make accurate comparisons with any alleged cost savings.'
It will be noted that these prohibitions are directed only against sellers.
The Robinson-Patman Act contains no prohibitions against the inducement and
receipt of discriminatory advertising and promotional allowances or services and
facilities by powerful buyers. However, the FTC has remedied this omission by
holding that the knowing inducement and receipt of discriminatory advertising
and promotional allowances by large buyers is an unfair method of competition
prohibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission's position
has been upheld by two United States Courts of Appeals.'
Essentially, sections 2(d) and 2(e) provide that if a seller offers advertising
allowances or merchandising payments or services to one customer he must
make his offer (1) available (2) to all competing customers (3) on propor-
tionally equal terms.
I. Availability
Section 2(d) requires that a seller who compensates one customer for fur-
nishing services or facilities in connection with the "processing, handling, sale,
or offering for sale" of his products must make such payment "available on pro-
portionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of
such products or commodities."'
The meaning of the word "available" has created two problems for those
interested in adhering to the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act. First,
what must a seller do to ensure that he has, in fact, made payments or services
available to all competing customers? Second, assuming that a seller is charged
with failing to make payments or services available, what evidence is needed to
establish and rebut a prima facie case?
Many definitions of the term "available" are possible. One which has been
advanced by some is that the term requires purchasers to seek payments or
services from sellers. Only if payments or services are then denied them (and
granted others) could it be said that the seller has refused to make such pay-
ments or services "available."
The Commission has steadfastly refused to accept this definition of the term.
1 See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65, 68 (1959), where the Court
described these sections in the following language:
Unlike § 2(a), none of them [Sections (c), (d), (e)] requires, as proof of a prima
facie violation, a showing that the illicit practice has had an injurious or destructive
effect upon competition. Similarly, none has any built-in defensive matter, as does
§ 2(a) .... In allowing a "cost justification" for price discriminations and not for
others, Congress could very well have felt that sellers would be forced to confine their
discriminatory practices to price differentials, where they could be more readily de-
tected and where it would be much easier to make accurate comparisons with any
alleged cost savings. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 96 F.2d 687,
692 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1938). And, with respect to the absence of competitive injury
requirements, it suffices to say that the antitrust laws are not strangers to the policy of
nipping potentially destructive practices before they reach full bloom. Cf. Klors,
Inc., v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
2 Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910
(1963); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
3 This requirement, despite the lack of identical phraseology, has been read into § 2(e).
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Simply put, the Commission has required the seller to make payments or services
available by offering them to all competing customers.'
The Commission's 1960 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other
Merchandising Payments and Services explicitly adopted this definition of the
term by noting in Rule 8 that: "The seller should take some action to inform
all his customers competing with any participating customer that the plan is
available."'
Of course, the Commission cannot dictate the manner by which an offer
must be made. However, prudence dictates that a seller use a method which
enables him to verify that all competing customers have been informed. This
protects not only his customers but also the seller if the availability of his plan
is challenged.
It is very risky to rely on word of mouth to satisfy this requirement; it is
not met by merely requesting salesmen to inform customers of the availability
of a plan:
A showing here not only that respondent's sales representatives had
been "advised" of its policies with respect to special promotional allowances
and "instructed to inform respondent's customers thereof," but also that
they had carried out such instructions, would have met the Commission's
definition of the statutory standard. 6 (Emphasis added.)
The best method of ensuring availability is, therefore, to adopt a written
plan which clearly defines the requirements of participation and which the seller
can prove has been sent to all customers.'
However, the seller has not fully complied with the availability require-
ments of sections 2(d) and 2(e) by offering his plan to all competing customers
if the plan itself limits participation to only a few of these customers. In the
words of the Second Circuit, "a promotional allowance is not 'available' to all
customers if it has been 'denied' to some." 8
Denial may take many forms. At one end of the spectrum it may take the
form of secret allowances to a favored customer.' Implicit in such secrecy is
the lack of an offer to other customers and, consequently, a lack of availability.
At the other end of the spectrum, lack of availability may be the result of
what the seller feels to be the unsuitability of certain customers to fulfill the
requirements of his promotional plan. The seller may be perfectly willing to
broadcast to all customers the terms of his plan (and in that sense he has
"offered" it to them). However, he waters down the availability of its terms by
placing restrictions on participation. He may require that customers purchase
4 Most Commission cease and desist orders spell out this requirement by the following
language: "... . unless such services or facilities are offered or otherwise made available. .. ."
5 1 TRADE REG. REP. 3980 (F.T.C. May 19, 1960). This definition of the term received
the judicial stamp of approval in Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480 '(2d Cir.
1962).
6 Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 5 at 485.
7 One could say all "competing" customers. This is, however, not an easily definable term.
Rather than trying to decide which of his customers compete, the seller would be prudent to
make his plan available to all customers. See, e.g., Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
16368 (F.T.C. March 29, 1963) (change in the definition of "competing customers").
8 Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 1962).
9 See, e.g., Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 89, 95 (1954).
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a minimum dollar amount of his goods or he may require that customers use the
payments in ways which are not feasible for them. In either case such plans
do not satisfy the availability requirement."0
Assuming that a seller is charged with having failed to make a payment
available to certain customers, what are the proof requirements of the prima
facie case? They are surprisingly sparse. According to two decisions, the Gov-
ernment need only establish that one customer received a payment and that
another, competing customer, did not. In Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC
the court held that proof of this fact "sufficed to shift the burden of producing
evidence of 'availability' to respondent.... ."" In R. H. Macy & Co. v. FTC2
the court held that once the Commission established that special payments had
been made only to Macy's, respondent (in this case, the buyer) had the burden
of coming forward with evidence that similar payments were available to Macy's
competitors.
Thus, once the Government has established the fact of lack of availability
it need not establish the reason therefor. Consequently, the requirement that a
seller establish and police his plan is very important. The Commission's require-
ment in this regard is based on the hope that such a plan will permit all cus-
tomers to participate. However, the existence of a plan is all important to the
seller. Assuming that the plan's terms provide for the availability of some type
of payment, its very existence and the fact of its publication is important evidence
that the seller is attempting to treat all customers fairly. Proof of its existence
and its publication may go far to rebut the easily established prima facie case.
For example, if a customer has not received a promotional payment, his failing
to remember the reason therefor does not injure the Government-for it has
established its case by proving that the payment was not made. Given the same
set of facts, proof by the seller that the purchaser, who did not receive a payment,
received a copy of the plan may rebut the prima facie case by casting doubt
on the reason for nonpayment.
II. Competing Customers
Any promotional plan developed by a supplier must cover all customers who
compete with any customer participating in the plan. Coverage of all competing
customers must be tested in two ways. The first test is essentially geographical:
What stores actually compete for the same business? A supplier is required to
offer promotional assistance only to those customers who compete in the dis-
tribution of the promoted product with any customer who is participating in the
promotion. Suppose that a manufacturer sells to ten retail stores in New York
City and ten retail stores in San Francisco. The manufacturer can lawfully
develop a program of promotional assistance which includes only the New York
10 In State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831, 839 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959), the court said that "an offer to make a service
available to one, the economic status of whose business renders him unable to accept the offer,
is tantamount to no offer at all." See Atlantic Prods. Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 11 17192
(F.T.C. Dec. 13, 1963) (minimum purchase requirement).
11 311 F.2d 480, 486 (2d Cir. 1962).
12 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964).
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City retail stores since they do not compete with the San Francisco retail stores.
However, caution must be used in defining the area of effective competition.
Suppose that a manufacturer sells to ten retail stores in Manhattan, ten retail
stores in Brooklyn and ten retail stores in the Bronx. A promotional assistance
program limited to the Manhattan customers would be illegal if the Brooklyn
and Bronx retail stores compete for the same business as the Manhattan retail
stores. It is the seller that has the duty to make whatever inquiry necessary to
establish whether customers, in fact, compete.
In a recent case the Commission found that Flotill, a West Coast canner,
discriminated against certain customers in the Boston area by granting advertis-
ing allowances to two favored chain store customers in that area. 3 Flotill argued
that it was unaware that two unfavored chains to whom it made no payments
or offers of promotional allowances were Flotill customers in the Boston area
because purchases for the Boston area by these disfavored companies were made
in San Francisco through the customers' buying offices on the "California Street."
Flotill also argued that they lacked knowledge that two other unfavored cus-
tomers were competing in the Boston area because their purchases were made
through the Topco Company, a buying organization.
The Commission ruled that:
• .. [Flotill could not] avoid their obligations under the statute simply by
closing their eyes to the obvious. A violation of Section 2(d) is determined
by objective rather than subjective considerations. If the favored and non-
favored customers actually compete in the resale of the seller's goods, the
Act may be violated without regard to the seller's knowledge of the lawful-
ness or unlawfulness of a disproportionate promotional allowance. To
hold otherwise would recognize the right of a seller to discriminate in favor
of or against any customer who conducts his resale operations in more than
one trade area. 4
The Commission has recently departed from its traditional view that a
supplier who sells to retailers directly and also to wholesalers who sell to com-
peting retailers does not have to make promotional allowances available to such
wholesalers when they are given to the direct buying retail customers. 5 This
change in position was presaged by the district court's decision in Krug v. Inter-
national Tel. & Tel. Corp.,"5 where it was stated that "violation of Section 2(d)
may occur when a manufacturer gives a retailer an allowance not given to a
wholesaler whose customers compete with such retailer." After Krug, the Com-
mission had the question presented in the Liggett & Myers case, but because of
the absence of factual proof refused to decide "whether a seller need make its
promotional allowances available only to those of its customers who are com-
peting at the same functional level."' 7
13 Flotill Prods., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. % 16970 (F.T.C. June 26, 1964).
14 Id. at 22042.
15 See Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565, 566, 573 (1956), where the Commission
adopted the hearing examiner's reasoning that promotional payments to a retail grocery chain
did not require comparable treatment for "wholesalers who resold to retailers and were there-
fore not in competition with" the chain.
16 142 F. Supp. 230, 236 '(D.N.J. 1956).
17 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221, 252 (1959).
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In 1963 the Commission squarely ruled in the Fred Meyer case' that manu-
facturers who give advertising allowances to their direct-buying retail chain store
customers must also make "proportionally equal" allowances available to whole-
salers whose retailer-customers compete with the chain stores.
The doctrine was further implemented by the recent Sunbeam Corp.'9
holding that retailers purchasing from wholesale customers of Sunbeam, were
" 'customers' of respondent within the meaning of the statute."20  In that case,
Sunbeam itself granted the advertising and promotional allowances to customers
of the wholesalers. The Commission stated that "even though the latter [re-
tailers] purchased respondent's merchandise from wholesalers, the wholesalers
played no significant part in the transactions alleged to violate Section 2(d)."21
III. Good Faith Meeting Competition Defense
For a number of years there was a great deal of confusion as to whether
the "good faith" defense permitted under section 2(b) was available in cases
where a seller was charged with making discriminatory advertising payments.
The Commission had asserted that the good faith meeting of competition author-
ized under section 2(b) could be utilized to justify a seller's discriminatory fur-
nishing of promotional services or facilities under section 2 (e) but not the seller's
disproportionate payments for a customer's promotional services or facilities under
section 2(d).22 The Commission based its distinction between the two sister
sections on the fact that the language in 2(b) related the defense only to "dis-
crimination in price or services or facilities," but not to "payments." However,
in 1961, the District of Columbia Circuit in Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v.
FTC flatly rejected the Commission's position and held that the good faith
meeting competition defense was clearly available to any seller charged with
violating section 2(d) or 2(e)."
Since the defense was not believed to have been available in section 2 (d)
cases, there has been little opportunity to test it in cases arising under sections
2(d) and (e). However, the defense has been offered in a number of 2(a)
price discrimination cases. In those cases the Commission has applied a strict
test and has limited the defense to those instances where a discriminatory allow-
ance was given to a purchaser only as a good faith response to a competitive
situation.
18 Fred Meyer, Inc., 3 TADE REo. REP. 16368 (F.T.C. March 29, 1963).
19 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 17178 (F.T.C. Jan. 11, 1965).
20 Id. at 22254.
21 Ibid. Previously, the Commission had ruled that a course of dealing by a manufacturer
with his wholesaler's customers could make those customers his own "indirect" purchasers
entitled to proportionally equal treatment. However, before such "indirect" customer relation-
ship could be found it was necessary to show that the manufacturer exercised such a substantial
degree of control as to be deemed to stand in the shoes of the wholesaler. Control usually is
indicated by the manufacturer fixing the prices and terms and conditions of sale directly with:
the retailer even though the goods pass through the wholesaler. American News Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). However, mere "missionary" activity to wholesalers' customers
on the part of the manufacturer or supplier had been held not to make those retailers "indirect"
customers entitled to proportional equality. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 56 F.T.C. 221
(1959).
22 Henry Rosenfeld, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 1535, 1549 (1956).
23 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962).
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After Exquisite Form was remanded to the Commission for consideration
of the 2(b) defense, the Commission rejected the defense. The Commission held
that the respondent had failed to demonstrate that the various discriminatory
allowances were made in response to individual competitive situations. The
Commission felt that the questioned payments were part of an over-all plan
devised by the respondents to combat the plan of competitors.24 Upon review
of the Commission's decision, the court agreed that under the Staley25 test the
use of the plan or a system to meet or combat another plan or system of a com-
petitor cannot be permitted under the good faith proviso.26 It appears that the
court in this instance has adopted the strict test advocated by the Commission
limiting the good faith defense to those individual situations where a seller
grants a disproportionate allowance to individual customers in order to meet
the competition of a competitor.
24 3 TRADE REG. REP. 116753 (F.T.C. Jan. 20, 1964).
25 FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945).
26 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1965 Trade Cas.) 1 71491
(D.C. Cir. July 2, 1965), affirming 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 16753 '(F.T.C. Jan. 20, 1964).
